


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Cold war spies: Why they spied and how they got caught

Stan A. Taylor^a; Daniel Snow^b

^a Professor of Political Science, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah ^b MBA candidate in the Marriott School of Management, Brigham Young University,

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Cold War Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got Caught

STAN A. TAYLOR and DANIEL SNOW

The purpose of this study is to ask why certain Americans decided to betray their country and how it is that they were caught. While the general intelligence literature has grown rapidly, not much has been written about traitors as a class or group.¹ Several books have been written about Soviet citizens who have betrayed their government, particularly about those who have defected to the West.² And a fair amount has been written about specific Americans who have betrayed their government, particularly the famous cases.³ But beyond the well-known cases, often little exists except one or two short newspaper articles on specific traitors. And as a *category*, very little has been written about Americans who have betrayed their government and revealed classified information to other states.⁴

For this research, we created a database consisting of 139 Americans who have been *officially* charged with spying against their government. We have attempted to include all who either began their treason or were caught during or immediately after the Cold War.⁵ To the best of our knowledge, this is a fairly complete list. Obviously, undetected traitors are not included and we have also left out moles or penetration agents – foreign agents who have entered America legally or illegally and have attempted to penetrate national security organizations – unless they acquired US citizenship and were caught. We have relied solely on public information and realize that this may not present the entire picture. But more information is publicly available than is generally realized. We collected information about 40 variables associated with each case. These variables included: date of birth, date of arrest, personal habits (gambling, drinking, and drug habits), sexual preferences, how they were recruited, and a range of other variables. For the purposes of this article, however, we include in Appendix A information about only seven variables – name, motivation(s), beginning and ending dates of espionage, duration of espionage, military service (if any), and occupation. As a rule, more information is available about famous cases. For example, several books have been written about John Walker, Jonathan Pollard, Aldrich Ames, and other well-known traitors, but virtually nothing has been written about Robert Lee Johnson, Glenn Souther, and many less

visible ones. For some of the traitors, there are significant gaps in our database. In some cases, in order to protect sources and methods, the government has not disclosed, and may not disclose for several years, information that scholars need – information that may change the way scholars view some cases. For example, the famous atomic spy Julius Rosenberg was prosecuted without reference to the most damaging evidence available against him since to make that information public would have compromised sensitive methods.⁶ Nevertheless, we have constructed a 139 by 40 matrix containing much useful information from which the following analysis is drawn and from which the narrower matrix included in Appendix A has been constructed.

WHY THEY SPIED

Models of Espionage

Some scholars have developed highly sophisticated models which, they believe, explain espionage.⁷ These models consider various psychological attributes, situational factors, and behavioral chains, coupled with insight from several academic disciplines. Others adopt rather simple models.⁸ Nearly all such attempts to explain espionage, however, focus on two areas: factors associated with the individual and factors associated with the situation. No single explanation adequately explains treason nor any other human action. Even the most treasonous of individuals must have access to classified information before it can be pilfered. And only a small percentage of those who do have access to classified information (fewer than .001 per cent) ever commit treason.⁹


Our research suggests that nearly all motivations can be grouped into four categories – money, ideology, ingratiation, and disgruntlement. Of these four, money and disgruntlement appear to be growing in importance and ideology and ingratiation appear to be waning (see Figure 1).¹⁰ We also consider a few additional, and probably idiosyncratic, variables which we believe cannot be overlooked, especially when combined with other motives

Money

Money appears to be the most prevalent motive for betrayal in recent American history. William Webster, when he was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), told a reporter that he had not known of a traitor since 1986 who had been motivated by anything beyond money.¹¹ 'It was a truism of the 1980s that ideology was out; materialism was in.'¹²

Our data reveal that financial gain has been the primary motivation in

FIGURE 1
MOTIVATIONS FOR TREASON BY DECADE



55.4 per cent of all cases of Cold War espionage, by far the single most prevalent motive. This counts those whose intent was to get money even though they may have been arrested before any money changed hands. When linked with secondary factors (disgruntlement, ideology, etc.) money was the motive in 62.6 per cent of the 139 cases. Seventy-one per cent of enlisted personnel were motivated solely by money. Until military pay raises in the early 1980s, pay for low ranking military personnel was traditionally meager and many of our cases turned to espionage merely to pay outstanding debts or to allow them to live more stylishly.¹³ Rather than turn to family, friends, or banks for loans, they turned to the KGB or related services.

It is difficult to know precisely how much money was involved in each case. Unless the foreign intelligence services revealed how much they paid, or unless the captured spy kept careful records of his or her payments, many dollar amounts are estimates. From what is known, it appears that 17 were paid between \$10,000 and \$100,000, seven were paid between \$100,000 and \$1,000,000, and four were paid over \$1,000,000.¹⁴ The recent American traitor, Aldrich Ames, typifies this financial motive. Ames related that he 'felt a great deal of financial pressure' and that it was stress from this pressure that led him to conceive 'a scam to get money from the KGB'.¹⁵

The scam got out of hand and Ames continued to betray his country. His reports to the KGB cost at least ten human lives, compromised scores of intelligence operations, and earned him at least \$1,397,300.¹⁶ Ames' vulnerability to monetary temptation is revealed in the crass 'Publisher's Clearinghouse'-like document given him by his Russian handlers. This piece of paper tallied the money and prizes available to him for his continuing service (see Appendix B).

The prevalence of avarice in these cases is remarkable. Thomas Patrick Cavanagh was sentenced to life imprisonment on 23 May 1985 for his involvement in espionage. Cavanagh was an engineer for Northrop Corporation who was working on what was called 'quiet' radar techniques. Facing serious financial crises, he contacted what he thought was a KGB agent and offered him information for \$25,000. As was often the case in our research, the 'KGB agent' was an FBI undercover agent and Cavanagh was arrested. His explanation is typical of many of those who were trying to get into the espionage business for monetary gain. Cavanagh matter-of-factly suggested that since he did not know how to rob a bank, he instead offered classified documents to a foreign country. 'There was this piece of paper. I thought it might be worth \$25,000. I took the avenue of least resistance. I didn't have the foggiest idea of how to rob a bank.'¹⁷

William Bell was arrested in 1981 for providing classified information about sensitive technologies being developed at Hughes Aircraft to Polish intelligence. After being arrested, Bell was asked if he supported or had sympathies for the Polish government. 'No,' he replied, 'Mr Zacharski [his Polish handler] had found a fool who needed money. I had a weak spot. He took advantage of me.'¹⁸

The prevalence of financial motivation may reflect increasing materialism and greed, but it also says something about recruitment techniques. All intelligence officers are taught to involve money as quickly as possible when dealing with potential or actual assets. When money is exchanged and a receipt is signed, the semblance of a contract is created. A reporting relationship based on ideology, revenge, or other motives is not entirely under the control of the case officer and is less stable.

Ideology

Conventional wisdom suggests that while most Soviet citizens betrayed their country for ideological reasons, Americans have done so solely for money. As with most conventional wisdom, this generalization is not entirely true. In fact, all traitors, regardless of national origin, have reacted to somewhat similar changing social circumstances. Many early traitors in the West appeared to be motivated by ideological considerations – at least to the degree that anyone acts on single motivation. In Britain, all of the

members of the Cambridge ring (Philby, Burgess, Maclean, Blunt, and Cairncross) were attracted to communism early in life. In the United States, the Rosenbergs, Klaus Fuchs, Alger Hiss, and Lauchlin Curry, as well as the much later Larry Wu-Tai Chin, had all been at one time members of the Communist Party.¹⁹

But after the famous atomic spies cases in the early 1950s, the number of Americans who spied for ideological reasons dropped dramatically. And those that do appear are not the typical cases of communist sympathizers. Several international events seem to be responsible for this trend – revelations about the horrors of Stalin were verified in the 1950s and Soviet violence in Hungary and other Eastern European countries did much to disabuse ideological communists in the West of the purity of the Soviet version of Marxism.

Ultimately, it appears, capitalist materialism prevailed over Marxist materialism – when historical and dialectical materialism failed, avarice was always ready to step in. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, money came to replace beliefs as a motive for betrayal. While Oleg Penkovsky risked his life in the late 1950s and early 1960s to betray what he believed was an evil political system, Victor Belenko, who flew his MiG-25 from the Soviet Union to Hokkaido in 1976, was more anxious to escape his dreary family life and line his pockets with large sums of money.²⁰

In about 23.7 per cent of 139 cases, we find ideology to be a primary motive. Even in these cases, other motives were apparent. For example, the Chinese-American, Larry Wu-Tai Chin, who joined the Communist Party in China in 1942 seems to illustrate the allure of money more than the allure of ideology. Chin may have begun as an agent-in-place for the Chinese communists, but the longer he lived in the West, the more he continued his espionage in order to maintain his rather opulent life style.

Jonathan Jay Pollard and Anne Henderson-Pollard also illustrate this shading of motives. The Pollards originally contacted Israeli military personnel and agreed to pass information Jonathan would obtain from the US Navy. Pollard's Zionist sympathies seem to have prompted his original betrayal, but, as with Chin, before long Pollard was attracted to the \$30,000 per year he was promised by his Israeli contacts.

But over the last 15 years, ideology has almost disappeared as a motive. Only six individuals appear to have entered into espionage for ideological reasons since 1980, five of whom appear to have been motivated *solely* by ideological considerations. Thomas Dolce (who actually began spying in late 1979) wanted to support the white-dominated South African government; Glenn Souther developed Marxist leanings while in college; Jeffrey Carney spied for East Germany, essentially because of his anti-American feelings; Michael Moore wanted to defect to the USSR while

serving as an American seaman in the Philippines; Frederick Hamilton's desire to end the perennial border dispute between Peru and Ecuador led him to give US electronic intercepts to Ecuadorian officials; and Robert Kim, a naturalized US citizen born in South Korea, appears to have been a mole. In fact, Hamilton appears to be the only *purely* ideologically motivated traitor to enter into espionage since 1984, and he was motivated by a commitment to peace rather than to a Cold War ideology.

Ingratiation

Ingratiation becomes a motive when information is betrayed to foreign sources in order to fulfill friendship or love obligations or in order to make favorable impressions on someone whose approval is desired. In our database, ingratiation figured as the primary motive in eight, or 5.8 per cent, of the cases. This is not enough cases to allow broad conclusions, but it does appear that ingratiation is declining as a motive. Ingratiation, especially sexually motivated ingratiation, may be a relic of the Cold War.

The use of same- or opposite-sex 'honey traps' to attract and, if necessary, blackmail potential traitors has been a favorite theme of novelists and scriptwriters, but has been little understood and vastly overrated by them. In our database, there are only four cases of betrayal brought on by blackmail and they are spread over many years – 1951, 1960, 1970, and 1984. Ingratiation's effectiveness may be judged by the handful of spies who were motivated by it. Though there is no publicly-available evidence to support it, we believe that if we had a record of every KGB, or related service, attempt to attract a potential traitor through some variety of friendship, the list would much longer than it is in our database which counts only those who succumbed and were caught.

The case of the only FBI agent ever arrested for treason illustrates this motive. Richard Miller was recruited by the FBI in 1963 and served in New York, Puerto Rico, Florida, and California. In 1981 he was given a counterintelligence position in the Los Angeles FBI office. His past performance had been far from stellar and he had been suspended twice for weighing more than FBI guidelines allowed. Moreover, his marriage was disintegrating. After a series of extra-marital affairs, in May 1984 Miller met Svetlana Ogorodnikov, who described herself to Miller as a KGB major. Miller became emotionally and sexually involved with her. Miller was arrested on 2 October 1984 and, after three separate trials, was convicted of espionage. Miller argued throughout the trials that he was trying to ingratiate himself with Ogorodnikov for counterintelligence purposes, but two different judges and even a member of Miller's family believed that the KGB had capitalized on Miller's emotional needs and compromised his career through seduction.²¹

Ingratiation's decline probably results from several developments. One is the end of the Cold War. Clearly, if Soviet and East European secret service defectors are to be believed, various forms of seduction were part of the KGB espionage arsenal.²² One prominent Soviet defector suggested that compromise and coercion based on various levels and types of friendship were techniques in which KGB officers were well-trained.²³ Moreover, seductions and sexual affairs now can have graver medical consequences than they did for much of the Cold War. Also, the instability of the international system and the fast pace of technological developments make long-term spy operations less useful. Effective and efficient intelligence operations today require short time success and do not allow long term development of relationships. Finally, the role of sex in espionage has always attracted more attention than it merited. American secret services have found that happy and well-adjusted family men and women make better agents than those who are sexually promiscuous, emotionally impaired, and susceptible to blackmail.²⁴

Disgruntlement

Like money, disgruntlement is a motive of growing importance. By disgruntlement we refer to the sense of personal dissatisfaction that stems from feelings of being overlooked, overworked, and under-appreciated. No cases of disgruntlement occurred in the 1940s, and virtually none occurred in the 1950s. However, as the military and defense industry grew, the likelihood of disgruntled employees taking revenge against their employers by betraying secrets also grew. Disgruntlement has grown in importance in the last five years.²⁵ Disgruntlement was the primary motive in 2.9 per cent of our 139 cases. People entrusted by their government with classified information are given a unique ability to exact revenge on that government if it offends them.

If we consider those who, though not completely disgruntled, were not entirely 'grunted' (to borrow from Oscar Wilde), then disgruntlement becomes a more prevalent motive. Disgruntlement comes from a variety of sources. Often, disgruntled because of low pay, individuals have attempted to supplement their income through selling information. We classified these cases as motivated by disgruntlement rather than by greed. In other cases, dissatisfaction with their treatment would lead individuals to treason. The case of Daniel Walter Richardson illustrates the latter point. Richardson was described in reports as a mediocre soldier, and in August 1987 was demoted from tank instructor to tool room manager for his chronic tardiness. Shortly after, he called the Soviet embassy in Washington and offered to sell them defense information. The FBI intercepted this call and, posing as the KGB, was able to stage a meeting with Richardson. At this meeting, Richardson

turned over a training manual and circuitry from an M-1 tank. Richardson illustrates disgruntlement leading to a desire for revenge and followed by an attempt to sell secrets for money.

Other cases illustrate this pattern. Allen John Davies left the Air Force in 1984 as a result of poor job performance. Two years later he tried to get revenge by attempting to sell classified information to Soviet agents. A disgruntled ex-CIA employee, Edwin G. Moore, followed a similar path. Unhappy about his failure to be promoted in the CIA, Moore collected ten boxes of classified documents and attempted to sell them to Soviet diplomats in Washington.

There is an interesting parallel between disgruntlement as a motive for espionage and disgruntlement as a motive for leaking classified or confidential information. Leaking is virtually a national pastime in Washington. Hardly a week passes without some public revelation of information that was meant to be confidential or private. Every president since Eisenhower has complained about the debilitating and discouraging effects of leaking. One in-depth study of several cases of unauthorized leaks revealed that disgruntlement and revenge are the primary motives of such leaking.²⁶

Other Factors

Other factors account for the remaining 12.2 per cent of our cases. As with more common motives, when combined with other motives these miscellaneous factors figure in a larger percentage of espionage cases. But as a sole or primary motivation, they are rare. Some, however, deserve comment.

One under-appreciated motive is fantasy. We were surprised by the number of spies who appear to have developed an addiction to the mystique of espionage. We call this the 'James Mitty' syndrome because it combines the allure of a James Bond lifestyle with a Walter Mitty sense of fantasy.

Two cases illustrate this motivation. William Kampiles was a young man who was so attracted to the life of espionage that he sought a position with the CIA's Directorate of Administration in March 1977 and was assigned to cable. When he did not get selected as a case officer in the Directorate of Operations, he concocted a plan through which he thought he could prove to his bosses that he had all of the skills necessary to be a case officer. Seeing a classified document left lying on a filing cabinet one night, he stole it, fled to Greece, and eventually sold it to the Soviet Embassy.²⁷ His logic was that as soon as he was hired by the KGB, he could confess to the CIA and become a double agent.


Jeffery Loring Pickering was convicted of espionage in 1983 and was described as a person who fantasized about espionage. Even in the many cases where money, disgruntlement, or ideology was the primary motive, we were surprised to notice the large number of cases where an obsession

with excitement and intrigue, or a fascination with spying, blended and shaded with other motives.

Though closely related to disgruntlement, a desire to bolster one's ego or self-importance also played a role in some cases. For example, Samuel Loring Morison was hired as an analyst for the Navy Intelligence Support Center (NISC) in 1974. Described by his peers as an 'oddball genius' and an 'eccentric patrician,' Morison considered himself to be above many of the rules that governed the handling of sensitive information. In 1978, two years after he was hired by the NISC, Morison became involved with *Jane's Defense Weekly* as a part-time editor. Morison regularly pushed the security limits until, in 1984, he provided *Jane's* with three secret US satellite-photos of a Soviet submarine under construction. *Jane's* published the pictures, revealing some of the resolution capabilities of the ultra-secret KH-11 spy satellite. Morison's principle motivation for doing this was to impress his higher-ups at *Jane's*.

Kinship was a factor in several cases. In the famous Walker case, John Walker involved both his brother and his son. Kinship even played a factor in the demise of the Walker ring – it was his former wife who reported John's spying to the FBI. The Pollard case involved kinship ties, Edward Howard's escape required his wife's complicity, and Aldrich Ames' wife was also convicted of spying.

FIGURE 2
MOTIVATIONS FOR TREASON



In summary, people enter into treason for a variety of reasons and any attempt to classify risks oversimplification since every human being is unique and no human act is ever motivated by a single factor. However, the cases in our database suggest that avarice, disgruntlement (including job dissatisfaction, desires to harm to one's employer and alienation), ideology, and ingratiation explain the overwhelming number of cases of treason. The next question, however, is how they are caught.

HOW THEY GOT CAUGHT

Many counterintelligence methods are closely guarded. But one can imagine that they are somewhat similar to crime detection methods. Known foreign intelligence service officers in the United States are kept under close surveillance and embassies and other buildings, particularly those of hostile states, are monitored. It is widely suspected that telephone calls and correspondence with certain embassies and individuals might also be monitored. But until 1978, one of the most frequently-used law enforcement techniques for detecting criminal behavior was not available to the intelligence community. That technique was electronic surveillance.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

In order to address that problem, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978. This act established warrant-like procedures to authorize electronic surveillance of foreign powers and their agents.²⁸ The effect of FISA on the detection and conviction of American traitors has been overlooked by intelligence scholars. The authors of the most thorough study yet published, for example, conclude that they 'cannot determine' why the government was more successful in the 1980s that it had been earlier in catching espionage attempts.²⁹ Our data suggest that FISA played a major role in this development.

From the end of World War II up to 1978, many changes were made to the procedures governing electronic surveillance for domestic criminal purposes. But the procedures for authorizing the collection of electronic surveillance for national security purposes remained the same – presidential authorization. Although presidents believed they had extremely broad powers to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for national security purposes, that practice suffered from two significant problems. First, there were many abuses. Presidents and other senior government officials could order electronic surveillance and place entities of foreign governments located in the United States or their agents, as well as US persons suspected of spying for these entities, under the most intrusive of electronic surveillance techniques without court issued warrants. These techniques,

especially when conducted against US persons, exceeded the 'unreasonable search and seizure' and 'probable cause' requirements of the Fourth Amendment. But, as long as national security was invoked, senior government officials were willing to overlook constitutional niceties and condone this questionable behavior.

Second – and from a counterintelligence point of view, perhaps more serious – the evidence obtained through arguably illegal monitoring techniques was often rejected by American courts.³⁰ Thus, many who engaged in treason against the United States found evidence against them either rejected by courts or found decisions against them overturned by higher courts. Aware of this latter fate, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), became reluctant to use evidence obtained in this manner in courts.

A series of lower court decisions between 1971 and 1977 accepted the Executive's argument that warrantless national security-related electronic surveillance could lawfully be authorized by the President or ... the Attorney General ... In several cases, however, surveillances were found to be unlawful when courts retrospectively disagreed with the judgments of Executive officials as to whether national security, rather than law enforcement, objectives were being served by warrantless electronic surveillance.³¹

Moreover, the government became reluctant to seek normal surveillance warrants through open court procedures for three reasons. First, to do so might result in unwanted 'publicity about the secret information and [establish] the fact of its loss.'³² To convince a regular court to issue a warrant required publicly proving the significance of that information, a task which often could not be done without revealing other classified information relating to it. Second, purchased secret information is often viewed suspiciously by the government that buys it. That government does not know whether it is false information made up just to make a sale, misinformation given purposely to mislead it, or valuable secret information which might enhance its national security. Corroboratory information revealed in an open warrant procedure tends to confirm the veracity and importance of the purloined information. And, third, and perhaps most importantly, to reveal enough information to obtain a warrant in an open court might compromise the sources and methods through which the information was obtained.

FISA changed all of this. It created a special court procedure that is 'consistent with the "reasonable search" requirement of the fourth amendment'.³³ Under FISA, the Department of Justice was not bound by the traditional 'probable cause' standard required to obtain warrants in normal criminal cases. Yet, at the same time, it was bound by specified procedures

which protected civil liberties by banning electronic surveillance of Americans merely on the order of a government official under a loosely defined national security standard.

[FISA] established comprehensive legal standards and procedures for the use of electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence and counterintelligence within the United States. The Act provided the first legislative authorization for wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes against foreign powers and foreign agents in this country. It created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court comprised of seven federal district judges, to review and approve surveillances capable of monitoring United States persons who are in the United States.³⁴

In general, FISA has been supported both by law enforcement agencies as well as by most civil libertarians. Evidence obtained under FISA has been accepted in courts as long as it satisfied the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence requirements of the act and as long as the procedural requirements of the act were met. Perhaps the most thorough constitutional justification of FISA can be found in *United States v. Duggan* (743 F.2d 59 [2d Cir. 1984]) where both Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges to this kind of electronic surveillance were addressed by the court.³⁵

FISA allows the government to obtain a court order authorizing electronic surveillance, but to do so in a non-public setting which protects national security information and intelligence methods from foreign scrutiny. The problems of the earlier warrant procedure were overcome while at the same time American citizens were assured that their government could not 'spy' on them capriciously.

Record of FISA

The record of FISA is good and may say more about the increase in successful espionage prosecution in recent years than other explanations. For example, 'between 1965 and 1974, an average of 177 warrantless national security surveillances were approved annually by the Attorney General'.³⁶ The FISA Court, by contrast, approved an annual average of 530 surveillances between 1980 and 1994 (see Table 1).

Given the length of time necessary to put together a solid court case for treason, the surge of espionage cases in 1984 and 1985 may be attributable to the impact of the FISA court. It is also obvious why 1984 is often referred to as 'The Year of the Spy' and the 1980s as 'The Decade of the Spy'. In the Ames case, for example, the FBI was searching for a penetration agent in the CIA as early 1987. After dropping the investigation in 1989, they began again in 1991 and identified Ames as the traitor in March 1993, but did not

TABLE I
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT COURT -
SURVEILLANCE ORDERS ISSUED

Year	FISA Orders Issued
1979 (partial year)	207
1980 (first full year)	319
1981	431
1982	475
1983	583
1984	635
1985	587
1986	573
1987	512
1988	534
1989	546
1990	598
1991	593
1992	484
1993	511
1994	575

Source: United States, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and Administrative Office of the US Court System.

arrest him until February 1994. Even after learning that Ames was the long sought KGB agent-in-place, it took nearly a year to complete the evidence necessary for a trial.³⁷

Until all of the classified information relating to the detection and arrest of each case is made public, it is difficult to document the precise contribution of the FISA legislation. But the raw numbers do suggest that FISA made a significant difference in the government's ability to detect and prosecute traitors. Clearly, the Carter administration's decision to prosecute espionage more vigorously also contributed to the higher arrests in the mid-1980s, but that new vigor would not have been possible without FISA.

Excluding those who defected and were not caught, from 1945 to 1977, 23 per cent of the detected spies were caught during their first attempt at espionage, suggesting that many continued their espionage for longer periods of time. From 1978 to date, however, 38 per cent have been caught in their first foray into espionage. This probably reflects not only increasing skills on the part of counterintelligence agents, but also the role of FISA in making electronic surveillance more available and usable in court.

Physical Searches

To make matters even worse for traitors, Congress recently adopted legislation creating FISA-like procedures covering physical searches, a category that was explicitly left out of the 1978 FISA Act. In 1980, then Attorney-General Benjamin Civiletti asked that requests for national security-related physical search authorizations also be considered under FISA. A few physical search authorizations were actually approved by the FISA court even though the original legislation was specifically limited to electronic surveillance. Several earlier attempts to include physical searches under the FISA procedures failed.

In 1981, however, the Reagan administration convinced the FISA court that it had no authority to approve applications for physical searches. It is somewhat ironic that 'the only government request that the FISA Court has ever rejected was done at the insistence of the Executive Branch itself.'³⁸

Following Aldrich Ames's arrest in 1994, however, both public opinion and the mood of Congress changed regarding physical searches. Physical searches are now under the FISA procedures and the government can obtain court orders authorizing access to phone records, banking information, and other personal data by following the procedural requirements of FISA.³⁹ Prior to this change, it was easier to tap a telephone than to obtain telephone records.

Faulty Tradecraft

In any discussion of why spies are caught, one often overlooked motive deserves mention. After reading as much data as was available about our 129 cases, we are amazed at the poor level of tradecraft, even abject stupidity, displayed in many cases. This is especially apparent among one-time-sellers, but even among those with some understanding of tradecraft, foolish blunders played a significant role in their eventual detection. One worries, in fact, that an especially acute spy with good tradecraft might be very difficult to catch. But even spies with some tradecraft skills (Walker, Howard, and Ames, for example) made foolish mistakes, perhaps stemming from feelings of overconfidence, which often betrayed them. Since 1976, at least 16 of the spies in our database telephoned or walked into the Soviet Embassy and asked if they would like to buy some secrets. In every case the FBI, who had intercepted the calls, met these would-be spies, bought what they had to offer, and then arrested them. In one case, the budding traitor threw a package of classified material with a note in it asking for money over the wall of the Soviet Embassy. The Soviets thought it was a bomb and called the Washington fire department who came and collected the material. Aldrich Ames, one of the most recent traitors, paid \$540,000 cash for a home while earning a \$62,000-a-year salary. Robert Hagewood walked

into a bar and started talking to a stranger on an adjacent stool about his desire to sell classified information to the Soviets. The man was an off-duty policeman. Time and time again, these spies would engage in activities that any thinking person would avoid.

INTELLIGENCE AFTER THE COLD WAR

Some have wondered whether clandestine intelligence gathering and counterintelligence activities are needed in the post-Cold War world. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has introduced legislation that would assign most of the CIA's current functions to State, Defense, and other government departments and change the focus of most intelligence gathering operations to open sources.⁴⁰ Less draconian is the proposal of former CIA director Stansfield Turner, who has proposed significant shifts in priorities in the US intelligence community. Admiral Turner believes that economic intelligence ought to be the primary goal of the intelligence community, and that it should reorganize its efforts to reflect that new priority.⁴¹

Others, however, might remind us of Lord Palmerston's adage, first expressed in the House of Commons in 1848, that there are no eternal enemies and there are no eternal friends, there are only eternal interests. If that is the case, then all states will continue to gather information about other states, and all states will try to protect against that collection. Even without the Soviet challenge, intelligence gathering will continue and counterintelligence efforts will still be necessary. In fact, the collection of both open- and denied-source information may be more important now than it was during the Cold War.

Stanley Hoffmann once said that as the 'physics of power declines, the psychology of power rises'.⁴² That is, as the material elements of power become less capable of shaping and determining events, then perceptions and images become more important. And as perceptions and images become more important, then what Joseph Nye call 'soft power' becomes more important.⁴³ With the end of the Cold War, the eggs of power – particularly nuclear weapons – have become relatively less important. But that merely forces attention to the hens that make that power possible – the economies and social and political developments of other states.

This logic suggests that all nations will continue to collect clandestine intelligence information and that all nations will need to protect against that activity through counterintelligence efforts. What has changed is the nature of the intelligence desired. Strategic intelligence – information about abilities and intentions of hostile or potentially hostile states – is still important. But information about general social, economic, and political

conditions of states has become perhaps even more significant. What used to be called non-strategic intelligence may be the new strategic intelligence.⁴⁴ In the information age, information, indeed, may be the principle commodity of international relations.

The recent case of Aldrich Ames, who may be the most damaging traitor in all American history, suggests two conclusions. First, treason is still possible, even after the Cold War. Ames began his treason in 1991, and continued to sell classified information to non-Communist Russia even after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989. He was identified as a Russian asset in March 1993, but not arrested until February 1994.⁴⁵ His activities were celebrated in Moscow, but will be condemned in the United States for years to come.⁴⁶ Within the last 15 years, we know of attempts by France, Israel, Japan, Germany, and South Korea to gather denied information about the United States.

Second, while some isolated cases of ideologically motivated treason may still be found, most recent treason has been motivated by cupidity and avarice. Knowing how difficult it is to change institutional directions, one can only speculate whether the profile of traitors that existed during the years that James Angleton headed the CIA's counterintelligence efforts made it more or less difficult to identify non-ideological traitors. Angleton headed counterintelligence efforts over the very two decades during which our data suggest ideology was declining and other motives becoming more important. Clearly, current counterintelligence profiles must pay more attention to the kinds of motivations we have discussed.⁴⁷ As a thoughtful reviewer of an earlier version of this article suggested, it may have been difficult for the CIA to find people like Ames when it was searching for people like Philby.

NOTES

1. The prolific writer Rebecca West published one of the early and interesting books on treason. In her *The Meaning of Treason* (NY: Viking 1946) and *The New Meaning of Treason* (ibid. 1964), West discusses some specific British traitors during World War II. Her Epilogue in both volumes is a good introduction to the concept of ideological treason. See also Chapman Pincher, *Traitors* (London: Penguin 1988) for a more lengthy discussion of treason.
2. See, e.g. Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Petrels: The First Soviet Defectors, 1928-1938* (London: Weidenfeld 1977) and the same author's *The Storm Birds: Soviet Postwar Defectors* (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1989). The best bibliography for both first- and second-hand accounts of Soviet defectors and Western agents-in-place is Raymond G. Rocca and John J. Dziak *Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services* (Boulder, CO: Westview 1985).
3. See e.g. John Barron, *Breaking the Ring: The Bizarre Case of the Walker Family Spy Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1987), Wolf Blitzer, *Territory of Lies: The Exclusive Story of Jonathan Jay Pollard* (NY: Harper & Row 1989), and Robert Lindsey, *The Falcon and the Snowman* (NY: Simon & Schuster 1979).

4. Of the recent books, Theodore R. Sarbin and *et al.* (eds.) *Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal* (Westport, CT: Praeger 1994) is, by far, the best generally available trade book. The Defense Personnel Security Research Center, created by the Dept of Defense in the wake of several security breaches in 1984 and 1985 and located at Monterey, California has published several reports, primarily for use within the defense intelligence community. See, for example, Suzanne Wood and Martin F. Wiskoff, *Americans Who Spied Against Their Country Since World War II* (Monterey, CA: Def. Pers. Security Res. Center 1992). See also, Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, *Merchants of Treason* (NY: Delacourt 1983), Ronald Kessler, *Spy vs. Spy: Stalking Soviet Spies in America* (NY: Scribner's 1988), Pincher, *Traitors* (note 1), and Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman, *The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story* (NY: Random House 1986). Most of these works are somewhat anecdotal and earlier works consider only a few cases.
5. Several classified data bases obviously exist; however, we have had access to none of them. By far the best and most thorough analysis of espionage cases is Wood and Wiskoff, *Americans Who Spied* (note 4). Their database was created from unclassified information; however, their study was conducted under government contract and they had cooperative personnel at all of the intelligence agencies with whom they dealt. Their database includes cases through 1990, while ours includes cases through 1996. As a contracted study, their report was not as widely distributed as it should have been. But any student of treason should obtain it. No research on American traitors would be possible were it not for the valuable contributions made by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center and the Dept of Defense Security Institute. The latter's *Recent Espionage Cases* is the only data available on some spies. Our rather narrow definition of traitor as an American citizen who was charged with treason caused us to omit several early ideological spies whose prosecution was considered too sensitive by the government. For example, we have not included William Weisband, an NSA spy, because he was charged only with failing to report to a grand jury even though he was a known spy. We have not included cases of economic espionage in our database unless the traitor was charged by the government under espionage acts. We did not include the case of two Connecticut company executives who sold carbon-carbon technologies and equipment to Indian defense-related organizations. They were convicted of violating export laws, but were not charged with espionage. Similar cases are discussed in Peter Schweizer, *Friendly Spies: How America's Allies Are Using Industrial Espionage to Steal Our Secrets* (NY: Atlantic Monthly Press 1993).
6. On 11 July 1995, the National Security Agency released communications relating to the Rosenberg case which could not have been made public at the time without compromising sensitive collection techniques. See David Kahn, 'VENONA Messages and Atomic Bomb Espionage,' in *World Intelligence Review* (formerly *Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene*) 14/2 (1995) p.1 and Lamphere and Shachtman, *FBI-KGB War* (note 4).
7. See e.g. the excellent article by Carson Eoyand, 'Models of Espionage', in Sartin, *Citizen Espionage* (note 4) Ch.4.
8. See e.g. the MICE model (motivation, ideology, compromise or coercion, and ego) first described by KGB defector Stanislav Levchenko, *On The Wrong Side: My Life in the KGB* (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's 1988).
9. Herbig accepts the figure of 3 million Americans holding security clearances in the 1980s. See Katherine L. Herbig, 'A History of Recent American Espionage,' in Sarbin, *Citizen Espionage* (note 4) p.45. Approximately 30 were charged with espionage during the same time period.
10. Joseph P. Parker and Martin F. Wiskoff, *Temperament Constructs Related to Betrayal of Trust* (Monterey, CA: Def. Pers. Security Res. Center 1991) p.50.
11. 'U.S. Finds it Difficult to Catch Spies Who Sell Out For Cash, Not Ideology', *Wall Street Journal*, 30 June 1986, p.26, quoted in Sarbin, *Citizen Espionage* (note 4) p.51.
12. Herbig, 'A History of Recent American Espionage' (note 9) p.51.
13. See *ibid.* p.53.
14. Wood and Wiskoff, *Americans Who Spied* (note 4) p.55.
15. The quotation is from an FBI transcript interview with Ames and is reported in US Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage*

- Case and Its Implications for U.S. Intelligence*, S. Rpt. 103-90, 103d Cong., 2d sess. (Washington DC 1994) p.11.
16. See US Senate, *An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Case* (note 15) p.39. *U.S. News & World Report*, 6 March, 1995, p.50, claims Ames' revelations could have resulted in 30 deaths.
 17. *The San Francisco Examiner*, 21 June 1987, p.1. Also cited in Herbig (note 9) p.54.
 18. United States, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Meeting the Espionage Challenge: A Review of United States Counterintelligence and Security Programs*, Report 99-522, 98th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC, 1986), p.118.
 19. For many of the insights in this section, I am indebted to Herbig (note 9).
 20. John Barron, *MIG Pilot: Lt. Victor Belenko's Final Escape* (NY: Reader's Digest Press 1980) is the most complete account of Belenko's delivery of the Soviet Foxbat jet fighter into Western hands.
 21. Most of the information on Richard Miller is taken from articles in the *Los Angeles Times* by William Overend published on 24 Oct. 1985, 7 Nov. 1985 and 15 July 1986. Mr. James McQuivey also interviewed Miller's son Paul in 1991 and used that interview in a class case study of Miller that is in the authors' possession.
 22. 'The use of sex to lure and entrap potential agents is known to be a technique of Soviet and bloc intelligence services', according to George C. Constantinides, *Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography* (Boulder, CO: Westview 1983) p.292. But Constantinides rightly discredits David Lewis' *Sexpionage: The Exploitation of Sex by Soviet Intelligence* (NY: Harcourt Brace 1976) for being based on 'a potpourri of fact, rumor, and speculation', p.292.
 23. Levchenko, *On the Wrong Side* (note 8).
 24. Joseph P. Parker and Martin F. Wiskoff, *Temperament Constructs Related To Betrayal of Trust* (Monterey, CA: 1991), pp.32-5.
 25. Herbig (note 9) p.50.
 26. See Martin Linsky, *How the Press Affects Federal Policymaking: Six Case Studies* (NY: Norton 1986).
 27. Kampiles sold for \$3,000 a technical manual for the KH-11, an overhead reconnaissance satellite, a highly classified US secret. This satellite, the capabilities of which were unknown to the Soviets, provided real-time photographs in high resolution. Had Kampiles known the significance of his information, he could have sold the manual at a considerably higher price.
 28. Public Law 95-511. This legislation passed Congress as S. 1566. Electronic surveillance refers to wire taps, television monitoring, hidden microphones, electronic tracing devices, and other electronic means to gather evidence. S. 1566 did not address the question of physical searches.
 29. Wood and Wiskoff, *Americans Who Spied* (note 4) pp.A12 and A13.
 30. Americo R. Cinquegrana, 'FISA: A Reformist Success Story,' in *Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene* 8/6 (1989) p.2.
 31. *ibid.* p.2.
 32. Herbig (note 9) p.64. The case of William Weisband, mentioned in note 5 above, illustrates this principle. Had Weisband been caught after passage of FISA, prosecution would have been possible.
 33. US Senate, *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978*, Report No. 95-701, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington DC 1978) p.9.
 34. US Senate, *The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: The First Five Years*, Report 98-660, 98th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington DC 1984) p.1.
 35. FISA has survived unscathed over 20 challenges in various court cases. See, for example, *United States v. Falvey*, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), *United States v. Megahey*, No. 83-1313, 2d cir., 8 Aug. 1984, and *United States v. Belfield*, 692 F. 2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982). These and other cases are discussed in United States Senate, *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act* (note 34).
 36. Cinquegrana, 'FISA' (note 30).
 37. US Senate, *Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Case* (note 15).
 38. Cinquegrana (note 30) p.12.

39. This is contained in Section 303 of S. 2056. See, United States, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994*, Report 103-296, 103d Cong. 2d sess. (Washington, DC 1994), p.8.
40. Moynihan explained the rationale for his legislation on Public Television's MacNeil/Leher News hour on 13 Feb. 1995. The text of this discussion is available on Lexis/Nevis, 15 Feb. 1995.
41. Stansfield Turner, 'Intelligence for a New World Order', *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Fall 1991) pp.151-2.
42. Stanley Hoffmann, 'Perceptions, Reality, and the Franco-American Conflict,' in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith (eds.) *Image and Reality in World Politics* (NY: Columbia UP 1967) p.58.
43. Joseph S. Nye Jr, 'Soft Power', *Foreign Policy* No.80 (Fall 1990) pp.153-71.
44. In 1976 and 1977, the Senate Intelligence Committee, on the urging of then member Senator Adlai Stephenson, III, undertook a lengthy study of so-called non-strategic intelligence – general information about the social, economic, and political conditions within the Soviet Union. In the wake of criticism of the intelligence community for its failure to see more clearly the pending collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the strategic importance of general social, economic, and political information now seems more apparent.
45. Literally hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles have been written about the Ames case. Undoubtedly, scores of books will follow, not to mention TV miniseries and movies. But the best brief official record is found in United States Senate, *An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case* (note 15).
47. It appears his KGB managers even sent him photographs of the 'beautiful land' on which his country house (dacha) would be located when he had to end his treason. See 'The Cold War's Last Spy', *U.S. News and World Report*, 6 March 1995, p.59.
48. Angleton continues to have supporters and detractors. Perhaps the most objective review of the literature about Angleton can be found in 'Of Moles and Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Literature, 1977-92' written by Cleveland C. Cram and published as an intelligence monograph by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence in 1993.

Postscript: Since this article was submitted, Harold J. Nicholson (CIA), Earl E. Pitts (FBI) and Robert C. Kim (office of Naval Intelligence) have been accused, but not convicted, of espionage. In all three cases, money appears to be the primary motivation.

APPENDIX A
AMERICAN COLD WAR SPIES 1940-1994

Name	Motivation or Motivations	Began Esp.	Ended Esp.	Duration	Civilian? Military or Employer	Rank
Ahadi, Mrs (pseudonym)	ingratiation	est 1968	est 1969	1 yr	yes Air Force	
Allen, Michael H.	money	Jul-86	Dec-86	6 months	yes Navy ret.	Senior Chief
Ames, Aldrich	money	est 1984	21-Feb-94	10 yrs	yes CIA	
Anzalone, Charles Lee Francis	money	Nov-90	Nov-90	single instance	no Marines	Corporal
Attardi, Joseph B.	NA	1969	1969	single instance	no Army	Staff Sergeant
Baba, Stephen Anthony	money	Sep-81	Sep-81	single instance	no Navy	Ensign
Barnett, David H.	money, revenge	31-Oct-76	27-Feb-77	4 months	yes CIA	
Baynes, Virginia Jean	ingratiation	1990	1991	1 yr	yes CIA	
Bell, William Holden	ingratiation, money	Jun-78	Jun-83	5 yrs	yes Hughes Aircraft	
Boeckenhaupt, Herbert William	money	1964	1967	3 yrs	no Air Force	recruit
Borger, Harold N.	ideology	NA	Mar-61		res. Air Force res.	Major
Boyce, Christopher J.	money	1975	Jan-77	2 yrs	yes TRW	
Brown, Joseph Garfield	money	1990	1991	1 yr	yes Air Force Ret.	
Brown, Russel Paul	money	Jul-89	Jul-89	single instance	no Navy	Petty Off. 3d Class
Buchanan, Edward Owen	money	Apr-85	May-85	1 month	no Air Force	Airman
Butenko, John William	money	21-Apr-63	29-Oct-63	6 months	yes	
Carney, Jeffrey M.	ideology	1982	1991	9 yrs	no Air Force	enlisted
Cascio, Giuseppe E.	money	1952	21-Sep-52	1 yr	no Air Force	Staff Sergeant
Cavanaugh, Thomas Patrick	money	Dec-84	Dec-84	single instance	yes Northrop	
Charlton, John Douglas	money	Jul-93	Aug-93	single instance	yes Lockheed ret.	
Chin, Larry Wu-tai	ideology, money	NA	Nov-85	NA	yes CIA	
Coberly, Alan D.	NA	Jun-83	Jun-83	single instance	no Marines	Private 1st Class
Cohen, Leontine	ideology	1945	1960	15 yrs	yes	
Cohen, Morris	ideology	1945	1960	15 yrs	yes	
Conrad, Clyde Lee	money	1975	1988	13 yrs	no Army	Sergeant 1st Class
Cooke, Christopher M.	money	1980	1981	1 yr	no Air Force	Lieutenant
Coplon, Judith	ideology	1940	1949	9 yrs	yes Dept of Justice	
Cordrey, Robert E., Jr.	money	Apr-84	Apr-84	single instance	no Marines	Private
Davies, Allen John	disgruntlement	22-Sep-86	22-Sep-86	single instance	res. Air Force ret.	Sergeant

APPENDIX A (cont'd)

Name	Motivation or Motivations	Began Esp.	Ended Esp.	Duration	Civilian? Employer	Military or Employer	Rank
Dechamplain, Raymond G.	money	1971	21-Jul-71	single instance	no	Air Force	Sergeant
Dedeyan, Sahag K.	money	1975	27-Jun-75	2 months	yes	Johns Hopkins APL	
Dolce, Thomas Joseph	ideology	1979	1983	4 yrs	yes	Aberdeen Prov. Grnd.	
Drummond, Nelsen Cornelious	money	1957	28-Sep-62	5 yrs	no	Navy	Yeoman 1st Class
Dubberstein, Waldo Herman	money, self-importance	1977	1983	6 yrs	yes	DIA ret.	
Dunlap, Jack Edward	money	1960	1963	3 yrs	no	Army	enlisted
Ellis, Robert Wade	money	Feb-83	Feb-83	single instance	no	Navy	Petty Officer
French, George H.	money	1957	1957	single instance	no	Air Force	Officer
Garcia, Wilfredo	money	1985	est 1989	4 yrs	no	Navy	Mstr-at-arms 1st Cl.
Gessner, George John	ideology, money	Dec-60	Jan-61	1 month	no	Army	Private 1st Class
Gilbert, Otto Attila	ideology, mole	pre-1977	Apr-82	5 yrs +	yes		
Gold, Harry	ideology	1935	1951	16 yrs	yes		
Greenglass, David	ideology	1940	1951	11 yrs	no	Army	enlisted
Gregory, Jeff E.	money	Mar-84	Oct-86	2 yrs	no	Army	Staff Sergeant
Haeger, John Joseph	money	Dec-89	Dec-89	single instance	no	Navy	Petty Off. 3d Class
Haguewood, Robert Dean	money	04-Mar-86	04-Mar-86	single instance	no	Navy	Petty Off. 3d Class
Hall, James W., III	money	1982	21-Dec-88	6 yrs	no	Army	Warrant officer
Hamilton, Frederick C.	ideology	1989	1991	2 yrs	yes	DIA	
Hamilton, Victor Norris	mental illness, ideology	Jul-63	Defected		no	NSA	
Harper, James Durward, Jr	money	1975	15-Oct-83	8 yrs	yes	Self	
Harris, Ulysses L.	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA		
Hediger, David A.	NA	Dec-82	Dec-82	single instance	no	Navy	Yeoman Striker
Helmich, Joseph George, Jr	money	Jan-63	Jul-64	2 yrs	no	Army	Warrant Off.
Horton, Brian P.	money	Apr-82	Oct-82	6 months	no	Navy	Spec. 2d Class
Howard, Edward L.	money, disgruntlement	est 1984	Defected		yes	CIA	
Humphrey, Ronald Louis	blackmail	1976	1978	2 yrs	yes	USIA	
Irene, Dale	money	Jan-88	Jan-88	single instance	yes		
Jeffries, Randy Miles	money	1985	1985	single instance	yes	Congress Steno. Co.	
Johnson, Robert Lee	money	Feb-53	Nov-64	11 yrs	no	Army	enlisted

APPENDIX A (cont'd)

Name	Motivation or Motivations	Began Esp.	Ended Esp.	Duration	Civilian?	Military or Employer	Rank
Jones, Geneva	ideology, ingratiation	1991	03-Aug-93	2 yrs	yes	State Dept.	
Kampiles, William	fantasy, money	1978	1978	single instance	yes	CIA	
Kauffman, Joseph Patrick	blackmail	1960	1961	1 yr	no	Air Force	Captain
Kearn, Bruce Leland	NA	Mar-84	Mar-84	single instance	no	Navy	officer
Kim, Robert	ideology	1979	Oct-96	17 yrs	yes	Naval Intelligence Svc	
Koecher, Karl F.	ideology-mole	05-Feb-73	15-Nov-84	11 yrs	yes	CIA	
Kota, Subrahmanyam	money	1985	1990	5 yrs	yes		
Kunkle, Craig D.	money	Dec-88	Jan-89	1 month	no	Navy	Chief Petty Officer
Lalas, Steven J.	money	1991	1993	2 yrs	yes	State Dept.	
Ledbetter, Gary Lee	NA	Apr-67	Apr-67	single instance	no	Navy	Petty Off. 2d Class
Lee, Andrew Daulton	money	1975	Jan-77	2 yrs	yes		
Lessenthien, Kurt G.	money	Mar-96	Apr-96	single instance	no	Navy	Submarine Petty Off.
OffLipka, Robert Stephen	money	1965	1974	9 yrs	no	NSA	
Lonetree, Clayton J.	blackmail, money	1984	Dec-86	2 yrs	no	Marines	Sergeant
Madsen, Lee Eugene	money	Jul-79	Jul-79	single instance	no	Navy	Yeoman
Martin, William H.	ideology	Jun-60	Defected		no	NSA	
Maynard, John Raymond	money	Aug-83	Aug-83	single instance	no	Navy	Seaman
Miller, Richard	money	24-May-84	02-Oct-84	6 months	yes	FBI	
Mintkenbaugh, James Allen	money	01-Feb-53	01-Nov-64	11 yrs	yes	Army ret.	Sergeant
Mira, Francisco de Asis	money, disgruntlement	Sep-82	Mar-83	6 months	no	Air Force	Spec.
Mitchell, Bernon F.	ideology	Jun-63	Defected		no	NSA	
Moore, Edwin G., II	money, disgruntlement	1976	1976	single instance	yes	CIA ret.	
Moore, Michael R.	ideology	Feb-84	Feb-84	single instance	no	Marines	Lance Corporal
Morison, Samuel Loring	ego	1984	1984	single instance	yes	Office of Naval Intel.	
Mortati, Tommaso	money	1981	1989	8 yrs	no	Army	Sergeant
Mueller, Gustav Adolph	fantasy	1948	1948	2 months	no	Air Force	recruit
Murphy, Michael R.	money	Jun-81	Jun-81	single instance	no	Navy	Seaman
Nesbitt, Frank Arnold	mental illness	01-Jun-89	14-Oct-89	4 months	yes	Marines & USAF ret.	
Ott, Bruce D.	money	13-Jan-85	13-Jan-85	single instance	no	Air Force	Airman 1st Class

APPENDIX A (cont'd)

Name	Motivation or Motivations	Began Esp.	Ended Esp.	Duration	Civilian? Employer	Military or	Rank
Paskalian, Sarkis O.	ideology, mole	1962	27-Jun-75	13 yrs	yes		
Payne, Leslie J.	ingratiation	1974	1974	single instance	no	Army	Spec 5th Class
Pelton, Ronald William	money	1980	25-Nov-85	5 yrs	yes	NSA ret.	
Peri, Michael A.	disgruntlement	20-Feb-89	04-Mar-89	2 weeks	no	Army	Spec
Perkins, Walter T.	money	1971	21-Oct-71	2 months	no	Air Force	Sergeant
Perl, William	ideology	1950	1953	3 yrs	yes		
Peterson, Joseph Sidney, Jr	ingratiation	1945	1954	11 yrs	no	NSA	
Pickering, Jeffery Loring	money	Jun-83	Jun-83	single instance	no	Marines/Navy	Hospitalman 3d Class
Pizzo, Frank Xavier	money	Jan-88	Jan-88	single instance	yes		
Pollard, Anne Henderson	ideology, money	1976	Nov-85	9 yrs	yes		
Pollard, Jonathan Jay	ideology, money	1976	Nov-85	9 yrs	yes	Naval Inv. Svc	
Ponger, Kurt Leopold	ideology	Sep-49	Jan-53	4 yrs	no	Army	officer
Ramsay, Roderick James	money	1983	1985	2 yrs	no	Army	Sergeant
Rhodes, Roy Adair	blackmail, money	Dec-51	1958	7 yrs	no	Army	Sergeant
Richardson, Daniel Walter	disgruntlement, money	1986	1986	single instance	no	Army	Sergeant
Rondeau, Jefferey Stephen	money	1985	1988	3 yrs	no	Army	Sergeant
Rosenberg, Ethel	ideology	1940	1951	11 yrs	yes		
Rosenberg, Julius	ideology	1940	1951	11 yrs	yes	Army Signal Corps	
Safford, Leonard Jenkins	money	10-Feb-67	19-Aug-67	6 months	no	Army	Sergeant
Scarbeck, Irving	ingratiation	1961	1961	single instance	yes	State Dept.	
Schevitz, Jeffrey	money, ideology	1977	1990	13 yrs	yes	professor	
Schoof, Charles Edward	money	01-Dec-89	01-Dec-89	single instance	no	Navy	Petty Off. 3d Class
Schuler, Ruby Louise	ingratiation	01-Oct-80	01-Jun-83	3 yrs	yes	Systems Control, Inc.	
Schwartz, Michael Stephen	ego	Nov-92	Sep-94	2 yrs	no	Navy	Lt Cdr
Scranage, Sharon M.	ingratiation	Dec-83	Jul-85	2 yrs	yes	CIA	
Slavens, Brian E.	money	Aug-82	Aug-82	single instance	no	Marines	PFC
Smith, Richard Craig	money	1982	1983	1 yr	yes	Army ret.	
Sobell, Morton	ideology	1940	1951	11 yrs	yes		
Soble, Jack	ideology	1945	1957	12 yrs	yes		

APPENDIX A (cont'd)

Name	Motivation or Motivations	Began Esp.	Ended Esp.	Duration	Civilian? Employer	Military or Employer	Rank
Soble, Myra	ideology	1945	1957	12 yrs	yes		
Soblen, Robert	ideology	1940	1960	20 yrs	yes		
Sombolay, Albert T.	money	Dec-90	Mar-91	3 months	no	Army	Spec 4th Class
Souther, Glenn Michael	ideology	1980	1986	6 yrs	res.	Navy res.	enlisted
Spade, Henry Otto	ego	Apr-88	Apr-88	single instance	no	Navy	radio operator
Szabo, Zoltan	ideology, mole	1967	1989	22 yrs	no	Army	Captain
Thompson, Robert Glenn	disgrunt.,blackmail,money est	1957	1964	7 yrs	no	Air Force	Airman 2d Class
Tobias, Bruce	money	Jan-88	Jan-88	single instance	yes		
Tobias, Michael	money	Jan-88	Jan-88	single instance	no	Navy	Petty Off. 3d Class
Tsou, Douglas	money	1980	1986	6 yrs	yes	FBI ret.	
Verber, Otto	ideology	Sep-49	Jan-53	4 yrs	no	Army	2nd Lt.
Walker, Arthur James	money	Jan-80	May-85	5 yrs	no	Navy	Lt Cdr
Walker, John Anthony Jr	money	Dec-67	May-85	18 yrs	no	Navy	
Walker, Michael Lance	money	1983	May-85	2 yrs	no	Navy	enlisted
Whalen, William Henry	money	Dec-59	12-Jul-66	7 yrs	no	Army	Lt Col
Whitworth, Jerry Alfred	money	1971	1983	12 yrs	no	Navy	
Wilmoth, James R.	money	Jul-89	Jul-89	single instance	no	Navy	Airman Recruit
Wold, Hans Palmer	money	Jul-83	Jul-83	single instance	no	Navy	Intel Spec 3d Class
Wolf, Ronald Craig	money-revenge	1989	May-89	single instance	no	Air Force	Airman
Wolff, Jay Clyde	money	17-Dec-84	17-Dec-84	single instance	res.	Navy res.	enlisted
Wood, James D.	money	Jul-73	21-Jul-73	single instance	no	Air Force	Tech. Sergeant
Yager, Joel	money	Sep-77	Sep-77	single instance	no	Marines	Corporal
Zborowski, Mark	ideology	1930	1949	19 yrs	yes		

APPENDIX B
AN AMES KGB RECEIPT

Dear Friend,

this is Your balance sheet as on the May 1, 1989,

- All in all You have been appropriated	2,705,000 \$
- From the time of opening of Your account in our Bank (December 26, 1989) Your profit is (Including 14,468\$ 94c as profit on bonds), which we bought for You on the sum of	383,077 \$ 28c
- Since December 1986 Your salary is	250,000 \$
- All in all we have delivered to you	300,000 \$
- On the above date You have on Your Account (including 250,000\$ in bonds)	1,881,811 \$ 51c
	1,535,007 \$ 28cc

P.S. We believe that these pictures would give You some idea about the beautiful piece of land on the river bank, which from now belongs to You forever, We decided not to take pictures of housing in this area with the understanding that You have much better idea of how Your country house (dacha) should look like.

Good luck,

Source: This is a typed verbatim reproduction of a photograph of the actual document Aldrich Ames' KGB handlers gave to him as reproduced in 'The Cold War's Last Spy', *U.S. News & World Report*, 6 March 1995.